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DISCOVERY-EXECUTIVE

PRIVILEGE-Overcoming

Executive Privilege to Discover the Investigative
Materials of the 1980 New Mexico Penitentiary Riot:
State ex rel. Attorney General v. First Judicial District

I. INTRODUCTION

In State ex rel. Attorney General v. FirstJudicialDistrict' the Supreme
Court of New Mexico ruled on discovery matters in all pending and future
civil cases arising from the February, 1980 riot at the New Mexico Pen-2
itentiary. In a writ of superintending control directed to all inferior courts,
the court granted an executive privilege to riot investigation transcripts
and photographs in the possession of the Attorney General. 3 The opinion
which the court issued in conjunction with the writ set out the test by4
which the privilege may be overcome to allow discovery of the material.
This Note examines the applicability of executive privilege to the investigative material and considers the requirements of the tests for overcoming that privilege.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Shortly after the devastating penitentiary riot in 1980, the Attorney
General of New Mexico conducted an investigation into the causes of
the outbreak. 5 The first phase of the investigation inquired into the events
which occurred just prior to, during, and after the riot. 6 It consisted of
interviews by the Attorney General's staff who promised confidentiality
to those being interviewed. 7 The second phase of the investigation dealt
1. 96 N.M. 254, 629 P.2d 330 (1981).
2. The Supreme Court's power to issue writs of superintending control issues from the New
Mexico Constitution: "The Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction in quo warranto and
mandamus against all state officers . . . and shall have a superintending control over all inferior
courts .... " N.M. Const. art. VI, §3.
3. The documents at issue were both transcripts of interviews and photographs compiled by the
Attorney General and the District Attorney. Brief of Petitioner, Appendix K-2.
4. 96 N.M. at 258, 629 P.2d at 334.
5. The Legislature appropriated $100,000 "for the purpose of conducting a study to determine
the cause of the events at the State Penitentiary on or about February 2 and 3, 1980, to investigate
any claims the State may have against other persons and to recommend any necessary changes in
the administration and facilities of the Penitentiary." 1980 N.M. Laws, ch. 24, § 9.
6. 96 N.M. at 256, 629 P.2d at 332.
7. Apparently, the staff acted without authority in promising confidentiality. Neither the Governor
nor the Legislature specifically granted the Attorney General the right to extend a promise of
confidentiality to informants. Answer Brief of Real Parties in Interest at 1. The Supreme Court noted
that the Attorney General cited no authority, either by statute or court rule, which authorizes such
a promise of confidentiality. Id.
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with determining and analyzing administrative practices and policies at
the penitentiary for the last ten years. 8 Personal interviews and anonymous
questionnaires provided the data for the second phase. 9 Based on all the
investigatory data, the Attorney General published a two-part summary
report. '0
Over five hundred civil cases were filed" against the State of New
Mexico under the Tort Claims Act' 2 for damages arising from injuries
incurred during the riot. In five of those cases, the plaintiffs sought
disclosure of all the investigative data, including transcripts of taped
interviews and photographs in the possession of the Attorney General.' 3
The Attorney General resisted each demand for discovery by filing motions to quash subpoenas for the investigative data and for protective
orders asserting that the prison study information and records were privileged. " Three trial judges, sitting en banc, heard the competing claims.' 5
They issued a joint opinion which recognized a "public interest" privilege
and an "executive" privilege, and required that the material be inspected
in camera before being released for discovery.' 6
The trial judges certified their decision for interlocutory appeal, but
the Court of Appeals denied the motion. 7 The Attorney General then
sought a ruling from the Supreme Court which would prevent discovery
of any of the materials and information obtained during the investigation. 8
The New Mexico Supreme Court exercised its superintending control in
the matter 9 and ordered the First Judicial District judges to follow its
ensuing opinion."
In its opinion, the court recognized the Attorney General's claim of
executive privilege to protect the investigative material from discovery.2 '
Based on the constitutional provision for separation of powers among the
8. 96 N.M at 256, 629 P.2d at 332.
9. Id. at 256-57, 629 P.2d at 332-33.
10. Both parts of the report were issued in June, 1980. Brief of Petitioner at Appendix 1-3.
11. Brief of Petitioner at 1.
12. See N.M. Stat. Ann. §§41-4-1 to -29 (Cum. Supp. 1981).
13. Brief of Petitioner, Appendix G.
14. Brief of Petitioner at 8.
15. No specific rule allows the district court judges to sit en banc. The Supreme Court, however,
authorizes "Each district court by action of the judge of such court or of a majority of the judges
thereof, may from time to time make and amend rules governing its practice not inconsistent with
these rules." N.M. R. Civ. P. Dist. Cts. 83 (1980).
16. Brief of Petitioner, Appendix I-I to -10.
I to -14.
17. Brief of Petitioner, Appendix I-I
18. Petition for Alternative Writ of Superintending Control, In the Supreme Court of the State of
New Mexico, No. 13504.
19. See supra note 2. The Supreme Court stated that it was compelled to exercise superintending
control because of "the number of potential cases that may arise out of the penitentiary riot and the
96 N.M. at 256, 629 P.2d at 332.
cumbersome and expensive trial and appellate process.
20. Id. at 261, 629 P.2d at 337.
21. Id. at 258, 629 P.2d at 334.
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three departments of the state government, the court reasoned that the
executive department had vested in it the "implied rights [necessary]...
to maintain its independence." 22 "Inherent in the successful functioning
of an independent executive," the court continued, was "the valid need
for protection of communications between [the executive] members. "23
The court also set out the test for determining whether the privilege could
be overcome.24
III. DISCUSSION
A. Test For Executive Privilege in New Mexico
The ruling of the New Mexico Supreme Court in State v. FirstJudicial
District applied to all pending and future civil cases arising from the
riot. 25 The court's recognition of executive privilege for the Attorney
General's investigative data protects it from ordinary discovery. The court
also provisionally set out a test whereby that privilege might be overcome. 26
The test consists of two main parts: a balancing test, and a test of
"admissibility." 27 District courts are to apply both parts of the test to the
requested investigative documents in camera, once the Attorney General
properly asserts the claim of privilege. First, the district court must balance the public interest in granting the privilege 28 against the individual's
need for disclosure of the particular information sought. Next, the trial
court must satisfy itself that the requested material would be admissible
29
in evidence and otherwise unavailable by reasonable diligence.
Careful scrutiny of the test set out in FirstJudicial Districtgives rise
to two important questions. The first question is whether a grant of
executive privilege serves the public interest in any civil case arising from
the riot. The second question is whether the "admissible in evidence"
portion of the test is properly applied at the discovery stage of litigation.
The latter question is especially important in view of the fact that the
State of New Mexico, Which is also the party defendant in the civil riot
cases, 3" has exclusive control over the information sought.
22. Id. at 257, 629 P.2d at 333.
23. Id. at 258, 629 P.2d at 334.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 256, 629 P.2d at 332.
26. Id. at 258, 629 P.2d at 334.
27. Id.
28. According to the FirstJudicialDistrictcourt, the public interest is in preserving confidentiality
to promote intra-govemmental candor. Id.
29. Id.
30. At the time of the issuance of the writ in First Judicial District, there had been over five
hundred notices filed against the State of New Mexico under the Torts Claims Act. Id. at 256, 629
P.2d at 332.
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B. Executive Privilege in General
The purpose of executive privilege is to safeguard the decision-making
process of the government. 3' It is designed to foster candid exchanges of
advice and recommendations within the executive department by protecting from disclosure the mental processes followed by governmental
officials in reaching an ultimate decision. 32 At the core of the executive
privilege doctrine is the conviction that the public has an interest in the
uninhibited functioning of the executive branch of government and that
branch functions most efficiently when its deliberative processes are veiled
from judicial scrutiny.33

When an executive officer asserts executive privilege to bar discovery,
courts engage in a balancing process to determine whether to grant the
privilege. 34 Courts weigh a need to safeguard the governmental decisionmaking process against the litigant's need for disclosure and the interest
of that individual in obtaining justice.35 The results of the balancing
process vary with the type of document at issue,36 as well as with the
need for evidence in that case. 37
Courts are most likely to grant the privilege when the attempted discovery is of purely deliberative memoranda. In Sprague Electric Co. v.
3 an American manufacturer
United States,"
sued the International Trade
Commission. Sprague Electric Co. was contesting the Commission's finding of "negative injury" to the company due to Japanese importation of
tantalum capacitors. Sprague sought discovery of the documents upon
which the Commission had based its finding. The documents in dispute
were statements of advice and alternate views prepared by the Commission staff. The statements set forth suggested criteria to be used, as well
as arguments for and against an affirmative determination of injury to the
31. See Cox, Executive Privilege, 122 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1383, 1386 (1974) [hereinafter cited as

Cox].
32. Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena, 40 F.R.D. 318, 324-25 (D.D.C. 1966), affd
on opinion below, 384 F.2d 979, cert. denied, 389 U.S. 952 (1967).
33. Cox, supra note 31, at 1386.
34. The exception to this rule is when diplomatic, military, or sensitive security matters are
involved. Even the most compelling necessity cannot overcome the claim of privilege when these
types of documents are at stake. See, e.g., United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1952). (The
United States resisted discovery of an Air Force report of a highly secret mission, on the ground
that furnishing the report would seriously hamper national security. The Supreme Court noted that
the United States was preparing for national defense and saw a reasonable danger that the report
would contain references to secret electronic equipment. The Court granted privilege to the report
without considering the need for discovery in litigation.)
35. Stiftung v. Zeiss Jena, supra note 32, at 329.
36. Comment, Discovery of Government Documents and the Official Information Privilege, 76
Colum. L. Rev. 142, 157 (1976).
37. Crawford v. Dominic, 27 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 1072 (E.D. Pa. 1979). See infra notes 48-52 and
accompanying text.
38. 462 F. Supp. 966 (1978).
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manufacturer. The court found that the documents comprised an integral
part of the Commission's deliberative process, and ruled that such material
fit squarely within the concept of executive privilege. 39
When the material sought is factual matter, and not deliberative memoranda, however, executive privilege does not apply. In Machin v. Zuckert,4° an Air Force crewman sued the manufacturer of an aircraft propeller.
The crewman claimed that a defect in the product caused an accident in
which he was injured. 4 To prove this case, the plaintiff attempted to

obtain an Aircraft Accident Investigative Report prepared by the Air Force
immediately after the accident. The Secretary of the Air Force refused
to release the investigatory files on the basis of executive privilege. He
claimed that the report contained Air Force deliberations and recommendations as to military policy to be pursued as a result of the crash. The
District of Columbia Circuit Court agreed that the portion reflecting such
deliberations should not be disclosed.4 2 The court refused, however, to
extend the privilege to the factual findings of the mechanics who examined
the wreckage. 4"

The Machin exemption of factual material from the scope of executive
privilege fits the policy of the privilege. The United States Supreme Court
explained the rationale behind the distinction between statements of facts
and deliberative memoranda, in EPA v. Mink." The court stated that
executive privilege existed to promote frank discussion of legal or policy
matters. "5 Because "compiled factual material or purely factual material"
did not reflect this deliberative nature, its discovery could not be "injurious to the consultative functions of government that the privilege of
non-disclosure protects." 4 6 All federal decisions which have ruled upon
claims of executive privilege arising out of civil suits recognize the distinction between facts and internal recommendations, opinion and advice.

7

Once a court which is confronted with a claim of executive privilege
decides that the documents in question fall within the scope of the privilege, it must consider the need for the privileged information. The privilege must yield if the need for evidence in the fair administration of
justice outweighs the value of confidentiality as an encouragement to
candor. In Crawfordv. Dominic,48 Crawford sued the Philadelphia police
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id. at 973.
316 F.2d 336 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 896 (1963).
Id. at 337.
Id. at 339.
Id.
410 U.S. 73, 87-89 (1973).
Id. at 87.
Id. at 87-88 (citing Kaiser v. Aluminum and Chemical Corp., 157 F.Supp. 939, 946 (1953)).
Cox, supra note 31, at 1416.
27 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 1072 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
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department and the city for damages. Crawford alleged that two Philadelphia police officers shot at him without cause. He sought discovery
of all citizens' complaints, as well as reports of previous improper gun
firings on the basis that the documnts might demonstrate "that the officers
had a propensity for violence and that defendant supervisors . . . and the
city knew or should have known of this propensity and did nothing to
protect citizens from the danger the officers may have presented." 4 9 The
police department asserted that the police documents were supervisory
evaluations, and were protected by executive privilege." The court, however, was persuaded by the overriding need for discovery of the documents
in this case. It stated:
Exempting supervisory evaluations from discovery might well bar
jury scrutiny of highly relevant evidence which cannot be adequately
developed in other ways: Supervisory evaluations may be the best
evidence available in this case of the state of mind of defendant
supervisors, and of other agents of the city and the police department
for personnel or policy decisions."
The court decided that a blanket rule which would shield deliberative
the discovery mamemorandum from discovery could not apply because
2
terial was likely to lead to relevant evidence.
Thus, when a claim of executive privilege is asserted to withhold
government documents from discovery, courts consider whether granting
the privilege would serve the policy of promoting inter-governmental
candor. If the type of material is integral to the decision-making process,
then courts weigh the need for secrecy against the need for evidence in
the particular case. When the documents consist of material which could
lead to highly relevant evidence, courts can order disclosure.
C. Application of the Executive Privilege Balancing Test to the Riot
Investigative Data
It is inappropriate to extend executive privilege to the investigative
data compiled by the New Mexico Attorney General after the penitentiary
riot. Lower courts will find that the documents easily overcome the Supreme Court's presumption of privilege when the trial judges apply the
balancing test set out in First Judicial District. The materials are not
deliberative in nature, but are factual. Moreover, the necessity of the
materials to the litigants far outweighs the purpose for keeping the materials confidential.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Id. at 1073.
Id. at 1076.
Id. at 1077.
Id.
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The data compiled by the Attorney General after the penitentiary riot
contain only factual matter, which executive privilege was not designed
to protect. One phase of the investigation consisted of interviews by the
Attorney General's staff concerning events directly concerned with the
riot.53 The remainder consists of answers, given by anonymous respondents, to inquiries into the practices and policies at the penitentiary between
1970 and 1980."4 The reports do not reflect any exchange of ideas within
the executive branch. They are merely factual accounts of the riot and
of the administration of the penitentiary.
Because the policy behind executive privilege is to protect the governmental decision-making process by promoting candid discussions between the members of the executive branch, the factual material compiled
for the riot investigation does not warrant such protection. The investigative material does not contain any deliberations whereby the executive
department reached a decision. The data contains no discussion by members of the executive branch. Facts gleaned from inmates and guards do
not reveal an executive's suggestions and will not inhibit future participation in policy-making. To expose the interviews, questionnaires and
photographs of the inmates, guards or correctional officers could not
threaten executive decision-making. The data therefore falls outside the
scope of executive privilege.
The potential value of the investigative data as evidence far outweighs
the public interest in witholding them through executive privilege, if the
privilege were applicable. The investigatory files contain statements of
eyewitnesses taken immediately after the violent incidents. Those statements have unique value. They were taken soon after the riot. They reflect
immediate perceptions of the causes of the riot by those who were actually
in the midst of the havoc and the bloodshed. Witnesses who may no
longer be available for further testimony because of death or some other
factor gave their versions of the events surrounding the riot. In civil cases
alleging misconduct on the part of state officials during the riot, these
firsthand accounts may be the only way to identify witnesses and clarify
riot incidents.
The need for the investigatory material as evidence increases upon a
consideration of the unfair advantage the state would have over the civil
plaintiffs in litigating the claims arising from the riot if the investigative
materials are not released. The state conducted the initial probe into the
penitentiary riot. If district courts grant executive privilege to withhold
data which resulted, then the firsthand testimony will remain in the sole
possession of the state. Thus, only one party in civil cases arising from
53. 96 N.M. at 256, 629 P.2d at 332.
54. Id. at 256-57, 624 P.2d at 332-33.
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the riot, the defendant state, would have the option to use the testimony
to find relevant evidence. A full and just litigation of the penitentiary riot
cases requires that the civil plaintiffs have the same access to the evidence
as the state has.
The value of the investigative data to the tort cases arising from the
riot, enhanced by its exclusive availability to the state, weighs heavily
in favor of disclosure despite the invocation of executive privilege by the
state. Granting executive privilege to the riot report data would fail to
serve the policies of the privilege. Additionally, application of the balancing test requires disclosure because the interests of the individual
litigants in obtaining the only immediate accounts of the riot far outweigh
the minimal interest of the state in withholding mere factual data.
D. The Admissibility Requirement
In First JudicialDistrict, the supreme court not only set out for the
district courts the traditional balancing test required in executive privilege
cases; it required that the courts also be satisfied that "the requested
materials would be admissible in evidence. . .. ,""Such a requirement,

taken in its most literal sense, materially alters the rules of discovery in
New Mexico and affronts the philosophy of liberal discovery upon which
the rules are founded.
The wording "admissible in evidence" was taken from United States
v. Nixon,56 an executive privilege case dealing with deliberations among
members of the executive branch at the presidential level. In that case,
the United States Supreme Court recognized a presumptive privilege to
presidential communications." The public interest in confidentiality in
presidential decision-making had to yield, however, to the demonstrated,
specific need for evidence in the pending suit.5" The Court then delegated
to the district court the "heavy responsibility to see to it that Presidential
conversations, which are either not relevant or not admissible, are accorded that high degree of respect due the President of the United States." 9
This high standard of confidentiality stemmed, according to the court,
from the United States Constitution.' The court noted the unique rule
under Article II, that a President's communications and activities related
to the performance of his constitutional duties.6
The rationale behind a presumption of privilege of presidential communications and a high degree of confidentiality cannot justify the "ad55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id. at 258, 629 P.2d at 334.
418 U.S. 683 (1974).
Id. at 708.
Id. at 713.
Id. at 715.
Id.
Id.
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missible in evidence" requirements for communications made by a state
attorney general .62 The United States Constitution does not bestow executive power upon state attorney generals; nor does it even delineate
their duties. 63 The New Mexico Constitution also does not grant power
or duties to the state attorney general.' 4 The admissibility test which the
Supreme Court deemed necessary for disclosing presidential communications is not appropriate for material from the state attorney general,
whose duties are neither constitutionally mandated, nor of the same magnitude as are those of the President of the United States.
The New Mexico Supreme Court's requirement that the documents be
admissible in evidence before they be discoverable contradicts New Mexico's philosophy of liberal discovery. The New Mexico Rules of Civil
Procedure allow discovery of material which "appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence." 6 5 New Mexico
courts interpret this standard broadly. The courts permit discovery of
evidence which "'[is] or may become relevant,' or 'might conceivably
have a bearing' on the subject matter of the action, or where there is 'any
possibility' or 'some possibility' that the matters inquired into will contain
relevant information." ' The liberal standard of discovery is radically
limited when matters sought to be discovered must first pass an evidentiary
test of admissibility.
The "admissible in evidence" test required by the FirstJudicialDistrict
court encourages speculation. Under this test, trial courts would be expected to know what would be "admissible" during the discovery stage
of the proceedings. Trial judges would have to guess about the final issues
for which particular evidence would be necessary as proof. Additionally,
trial judges would have to speculate about what actual witness testimony
would be in order to rule on whether that testimony would or would not
be admissible. For example, the trial court would have to make such a
decision before it could order release of impeaching testimony.
The admissibility test, if construed literally, imposes an impossible
burden on plaintiffs in the riot cases. The purpose of discovery is to
narrow the issues and solidify the case.67 During the discovery stage, riot
62. This is especially so when the material sought to be discovered is not a communication of
the Attorney General at all but is a compilation of facts. See supra text accompanying notes 4047.
63. See U.S. Const. art. 1I,§§ 1-4.
64. The New Mexico Constitution mentions the state attorney general's office only to specify its
term of years, N.M. Const. art. V, § 1,to provide for the annual compensation for the attorney
general, N.M. Const. art. V, § 12, and to delegate the attorney general as attorney for the corporation
commission, N.M. Const. art. XI, §4.
65. N.M. R. Civ. P. 26(b) (1978).
66. United Nuclear v. General Atomic Corp., 96 N.M. 155, 174, 629 P.2d 231, 250 (1980)
(footnotes omitted).
67. 4 J.Moore and J. Lucas, Moore's Federal Practice, 26.02 (2d ed. 1982).
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plaintiffs cannot know what testimony will ultimately be needed during
the trial. They cannot know what is relevant until the final issues are
formulated. Only through discovery can either side narrow the issues to
those which are supportable by admissible evidence.
The admissibility test unfairly increases the plaintiffs' burden in a
second way. To deny riot plaintiffs access to the investigative data may
keep them from information which, although not in itself admissible,
might lead to admissible evidence.68 For example, statements by prison
guards or inmates which are hearsay, or unduly prejudicial, could nonetheless aid riot plaintiffs in discovering relevant evidence. Plaintiffs cannot
depose the witnesses who made the statements, however, if they are not
allowed to make an initial survey of the investigatory data.
The extra requirement of admissibility does not promote judicial economy. One purpose of discovery is to narrow and clarify the basic issues
between parties.69 Discovery educates the parties in advance of trial as
to the real value of their claims and defenses. 7" Requiring district courts,
instead of counsel, to make the selections of theories by wading through
much irrelevant evidence wastes judicial time and is antithetical to the
notion that the parties themselves should form the posture of the case.
Courts would have to rule on admissibility, not only at the trial itself,
but before trial as well and more judicial time would be wasted by the
double ruling.
Only subsequent elaboration on the "admissible in evidence" requirement, through further judicial opinions, will reveal exactly what the court
meant by the term "admissible." Because any ruling on evidentiary "admissibility" would be hypothetical, perhaps the term will encompass any
set of circumstances in which the relevance of the material may be anticipated. The evidentiary definition of the term "admissibility" cannot
apply because it contradicts the liberal discovery rules of New Mexico.
E. Equal Protection
The New Mexico Supreme Court ruling in State v. FirstJudicialDistrict
may also deny equal protection to plaintiffs in penitentiary riot cases."
The decision of the court to extend executive privilege constitutes state
action.72 The governmental purposes of executive privilege, according to
68. This burden contradicts the standard that the privilege must yield if the discovery material is
likely to lead to relevant evidence. See supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text.
69. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
70. 4 J. Moore and J. Lucas, Moore's Federal Practice 26.02[2] (2d ed. 1982).
71. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § I states that a state may not "deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
72. In Haley v. Troy, 338 F. Supp. 794 (D. Mass. 1972), court action was considered state action
for purposes of equal protection analysis.
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the court, are: "to safeguard the decision-making process of the government by fostering candid expression of recommendations and advice and
to protect this process from disclosure." 73 To achieve those ends of executive privilege, the court created a subclass of penitentiary riot plaintiffs
within the larger class of civil plaintiffs.74 Denying the riot plaintiffs access
to the sought-after material deprives them of the75 use of the liberal discovery rules afforded to all other civil plaintiffs.
When a state action denies a fundamental right to a class of people, a
compelling state interest must be furthered.76 When such an action is
alleged to have occurred, courts strictly scrutinize the action .7 Access to
the legal process is a fundamental right under the equal protection analysis.78 Furthermore, adequate discovery in litigation must be considered
an integral part of the legal process. The state must show, therefore, that
its action of denying access to the sought-after investigative material, and
thereby its denial of the plaintiffs' rightful use of the legal process promotes a compelling state interest.
Denying certain plaintiffs full discovery does not serve even a legitimate
state interest, much less a compelling one. The extension of executive
privilge to the investigative data will not safeguard the decision-making
process because decision-making material is not at stake. The withholding
of witness accounts of a riot will not foster expression of recommendations
within the executive branch of government.
IV. CONCLUSION
The test for overcoming executive privilege as to the investigative
material of the penitentiary riot may preclude plaintiffs who are suing the
State of New Mexico from discovering information which is relevant to
their cases. The first part of the test, concerning the public interest in
granting executive privilege, should not present an insurmountable obstacle. The material in the compiled data is factual, not deliberative, and
the investigative material is essential to full and fair litigation of the civil
cases. The second part of the test, however, which requires that the
material sought to be discovered be admissible in evidence may be impossible for plaintiffs to meet. Additionally, the ruling may create a class
73. 96 N.M. at 258, 629 P.2d at 334.
74. The ruling applies only to civil cases arising from the riot, and not to other civil cases. Id.
at 256, 629 P.2d at 332.
75. See N.M. R. Civ. P. 26(b); See also supra text accompanying notes 65-66.
76. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
77. Id. at 337.
78. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). In Griffin, the court determined that access to and the
use of trial transcripts was a part of the "legal process."
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of people, the riot plaintiffs, who are denied equal access to the litigation
process in violation of the equal protection clause of the United States
Constitution. Only future interpretation by the courts will determine whether
the plaintiffs will be completely denied access to the investigation materials, as a literal reading of the FirstJudicialDistrictopinion indicates.
PIA GALLEGOS

